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Regulating civility, governing security and policing 
(dis)order under conditions of uncertainty 
 
Adam Crawford 
 
 
 ‘Can we know the risks we face, now or in the future? No, we cannot: but yes, we must 
act as if we do.’ (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982: 1) 
 
 
As historians correctly remind us, we live in what are undoubtedly the most secure, 
orderly and civil times in the history of humanity, in Europe in particular. The 
dangers threatening our lives and our person are fewer and further between than in 
the past. We live longer and generally are more prosperous. Ironically, however, as 
Bauman (2006: 130) notes, it is here and at this time, ‘that the addiction to fear and 
the securitarian obsession have made the most spectacular careers in the recent 
years. Contrary to the objective evidence, it is the people who live in the greatest 
comfort on record, more cosseted and pampered than any other people in history, 
who feel more threatened, insecure and frightened, more inclined to panic, and more 
passionate about everything related to security and safety than people in most other 
societies, past and present’. It is against this paradoxical backdrop, in which the 
scope of personal freedom and individual autonomy have apparently expanded, that 
the obsessive quest on the part of governments and citizenry alike for security, order 
and civility increasingly inform and infuse diverse aspects of everyday life and its 
contemporary governance. Despite the relative safety to body and possessions and 
the declining aggregate crime rates experienced across many western jurisdictions in 
recent decades (at least since the mid-1990s), governing threats to personal safety 
and local social order have become major governmental preoccupations. They have 
become a focal point for attention, activities and actions. Consequently, the fears 
born and fed by subjective and existential insecurities have become very real in their 
consequences. They have become self-stimulating and aggrandizing. In that they 
prompt defensive actions and breathe life into institutional quests for (unattainable 
total) security, they tend to scatter tangible reminds of our vulnerabilities and 
anxieties, and, in so doing, give credibility and immediacy to the threats from which 
fears over safety are deemed to emanate. Bauman once more notes: ‘It is our 
response to anxiety that recasts somber premonition as daily reality, giving a flesh-
and-blood body to a spectre’ (ibid.: 133). 
 
The aim of this paper is deliberately wide-ranging as it attempts to draw connections 
and linkages between some of the specific themes engaged with in this collection of 
essays. I intend to illustrate the manner in which regulatory ideas and practices have: 
(i) challenged criminal law responses to crime and disorder; (ii) blurred traditional 
distinctions between crime/incivility, criminal/civil law and formal/informal 
responses; and (iii) been appropriated in an assault on principles of criminal justice - 
notably proportionality, due process and protections for young people. Furthermore, 
I hope to demonstrate how under conditions of uncertainty, novel regulatory ideas 
have fostered precaution, prevention and pre-emption that prompt more intensive, 
more extensive and earlier interventions. In presenting these arguments, I will draw 
primarily on examples from the UK, but with the implication or inference that the 
themes to which I refer have resonance and salience beyond the UK in other parts of 
Europe, notably in the Netherlands, albeit that these are likely to take specific forms, 
influenced by differing constitutional arrangements, local cultures and political 
traditions. 
 
In this paper, I highlight the convergence of four inter-related thematic trends that 
collectively influence and go some way to help explain the scope and nature of 
contemporary security governance and the politics of urban safety. The first of these 
has been described as the ‘individualisation of risk’ (Beck et al. 1994; Beck and 
Beck-Gernsheim 2001; Bauman 2001a), a conceptualisation that foregrounds the 
manner in which human identity is progressively transformed from a fixed ‘given’ 
to a malleable ‘task’, whereby individuals are charged with responsibility for 
choosing and performing that task and for the consequences or their performance. 
Second, and allied to this, is the ‘politics of behaviour’ (Field 2003), whereby 
governments have increasingly re-focused their energies on governing individual 
behaviour, incivilities and local social disorder. The third trend has seen a shift in 
modes of governance from law to ‘regulation’ (Braithwaite 2008); from traditional 
‘command and control’ style government to forms of governance ‘at a distance’ 
through ‘regulated self-regulation’. The final trend concerns the manner in which 
‘risk’ and ‘risk assessment’ as organising narratives of governance have been 
augmented and supplanted by conditions of ‘uncertainty’ which have placed an 
emphasis on precaution as an organised response. In conclusion, I draw these 
strands together to suggest that in the search for security, civility and order and in a 
context of uncertainty, a precautionary logic has increasingly come to the fore. As a 
result, the threshold for intervention and the grounds for pre-emptive action have 
become dramatically refigured and lowered such that mere suspicion, the subjective 
perceptions of others and fears about what might occur - infused by worst-case 
scenarios - come to constitute sufficient grounds for governmental actions. 
Moreover, these interventions have significant implications in that they infringe 
liberties and restrict freedoms of those deemed ‘dangerous’, ‘awkward’ or 
‘different’ as much for what they might do as for what they have done. 
 
The ‘Individualisation of Risk’ 
 
Ulrich Beck’s ‘Risk Society’ thesis has influenced and informed much recent 
thinking in the social sciences. In essence, he argues that the ‘risk society’ 
constitutes a new stage of modernity, which has seen the production of new risks 
that lie beyond the control of nation states with potential impact that transcends 
national territories. Global warming is the archetypical example of such risk. In the 
process, it is argued, managing hazards has become a central preoccupation of 
contemporary societies. As ‘risk’ thinking has spread and risk assessment 
technologies have proliferated, so individuals and institutions have become heavily 
dependent on expert advisors; to provide guidance as to what is healthy and what is 
safe. However, in response to such questions, scientific experts frequently provide 
conflicting information, facts and opinions. Science in this light is shown to be 
fallible. Beck notes: ‘Science becomes indispensable, and at the same time devoid of 
its original validity claims’ (1992: 165). This fallibility of scientific advice 
engenders uncertainty and anxiety among a wary public. Moreover, in the 
subsequent public debate, risk professionals no longer monopolise risk-talk nor do 
they exclusively influence policy-formation. This both democratises debate – in that 
the radio chat shows’ conclusions and the views of ordinary members of the public 
may be as valid as those of the ‘experts’ - and simultaneously renders policy debate 
more volatile.  
 
This argument has obvious implications for governments’ limited capacity to 
manage and assert sovereign control over contemporary risks, notably in the face of 
global forces – as illustrated by the recent financial crisis. So too, it has implications 
for individuals. The break-up of the welfare state and the onset of neo-liberal 
reforms have served to proliferate and disperse risks once deemed the responsibility 
of the nation-state. Where previously contained through social insurance – public 
welfare provisions - risks have increasingly become individualised. In this light, a 
defining feature of contemporary living is the institutionalised need, on behalf of 
individuals, to construct and invent one’s own ‘self’ and actively shape one’s future 
in the face of contemporary risks. According to Bauman: ‘Modernity replaces 
determination of social standing with compulsive and obligatory self-determination’ 
(2001b: xv); individuals’ life trajectories become ‘elective’. Here ‘choice’ becomes 
not only a meta-narrative and defining condition, but also a requirement. How one 
lives becomes a ‘biographical solution to systemic contradictions’ (Beck 1992). 
Whilst, risks continue to be socially produced, it is the responsibility and the 
necessity of coping with them that have become increasingly individualised. Failure, 
too, is internalised as the product of one’s own doings. Social problems are thereby 
recast as personal faults and individual deficiencies. Public issues are redefined as 
private and personal troubles: 
 ‘Living your own life therefore entails taking responsibility for personal misfortunes and 
unanticipated events. Typically, this is not only an individual perception, but a culturally 
binding mode of attribution. It corresponds to an image of society in which individuals 
are not passive reflections of circumstances but active shapers of their own lives, within 
varying degrees of limitation.’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001: 24) 
 
‘Individualisation’ exhibits both a positive face and a dark side. ‘Creating the self’ 
generates self-determination with democratic potential, whereby individuals can 
escape from fate and social conventions to play a greater part in public life, 
particularly evident in the increased range of apparent choices and wider public 
participation available to girls (Arnot 2008). However, the flip-side of this 
obligation to actively shape one’s future destiny is personal blame for failure: ‘Your 
own life – your own failure’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001: 24). Consequently, 
causes are detached from wider structural or societal dynamics and become fastened 
to individual responsibility; bad outcomes are the result of bad choices as well as the 
incapacity of individuals to respond to opportunities and actively shape events. In 
this regard, binding traditions, social institutions and long-term commitments have 
been replaced by diverse forms of institutional guidance. This guidance focuses 
more evidently on influencing people’s choice rather than the circumstance in which 
choices are made or people’s capacities to realise their preferences. As a 
consequence, individualisation produces vastly different effects where there are 
institutional resources (welfare, education, health, human rights, etc.) which people 
can draw upon in coping with the contradictions of modern personal biographies.  
 
Some time ago, Catherine Villeneuve-Gokalp (1981) noted that ‘when the age of 
choice arrives’ – quand vient l'âge des choix – it has particular ramifications for 
young people in transitions to adulthood. Young people are literally charged with 
making their own bed and lying in it! Yet, the overwhelming evidence, from Britain 
at least, is that despite the institutionalisation of individual choice, the scope for 
youth social mobility has narrowed over recent decades. A recent IPPR report - 
aptly entitled Freedom’s Orphans - that provides an overview of the evidence in 
relation to youth attainment concluded that: ‘Family background is becoming a more 
important determinant of outcomes across the board’ (Margo et al. 2006: 47). 
Furthermore, whilst the measures of youth attainment are improving for the majority 
of young people, for the most disadvantaged groups many indicators are getting 
worse. Social class remains the most powerful explanation of outcomes and 
behaviour. Consequently, ‘the current conception of what young people need in 
order to succeed in life (exercising their own “agency”) and the role of the state in 
supporting them is increasingly anachronistic’ (ibid.: vii). Not only are young people 
burdened with greater responsibility to construct their own ‘do-it-yourself’ 
biographies, but so too this apparent freedom (albeit trapped within the strictures of 
social and structural constraints) carries a latent anxiety-generating threat for on-
looking adult populations as they recoil at the perceived implications for traditional 
social mores and values. Moreover, under contemporary conditions, young people 
appear less reliant on adults for access to information, goods and services in a 
consumerist society, in which rapid developments in technology often serve to 
undermine paternalistic social relations and traditional practices as young people are 
more adept at adjusting to and exploiting technological innovations. These pressures 
on intergenerational relations present common dilemmas and questions about youth 
across Europe (Lagrée 2002). They express themselves in concerns about ‘the 
disappearance of childhood’ (Postman 1982), ‘toxic childhood’ (Palmer 2006) and a 
‘crisis in child well-being’ (Layard and Dunn 2009) as well as in fears about young 
people as harbingers of social decline. Nowhere is this more evident than in the UK 
which was placed bottom of a league table of 21 rich countries on diverse indicators 
of child well-being (UNICEF 2007). The American Time magazine aptly captured 
the mood with its April 2008 cover story: ‘Unhappy, unloved and out of control: An 
epidemic of violence, crime and drunkenness has made Britain scared of its young’. 
Consequently, as Beck and Beck-Gernsheim assert: ‘the talk of a “decline of values” 
contains something else, namely the fear of freedom, including the fear of freedom’s 
children, who must struggle with new and different types of problems raised by 
internalised freedom’ (2001: 158, emphasis in original). In this context, the youth 
population is easily viewed as fear-inducing and incomprehensible to older 
generations in a way that is both novel but simultaneously reinforces longstanding 
and recurring themes regarding the manner in which one generation bemoans 
declining standards and projects concerns about moral decay on its youth (Pearson 
1983).  
 
 
The ‘Politics of Behaviour’ 
 
It is this ‘fear of freedom’ and more specifically the ‘fear of freedom’s children’ 
which in large part animates the second trend to which I now turn. In his book 
Neighbours from Hell: The Politics of Behaviour, Frank Field (2003) – an influential 
member of Tony Blair’s first New Labour government in 1997 - argues that the 
foremost issue facing governments is the collapse in social virtues and common 
decencies. For Field, the ‘politics of behaviour’ has replaced the historic ‘politics of 
class’ that structured traditional political divisions and was instrumental in moulding 
respectability and decency in Britain during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
This decline in standards of civility, according to Field, finds its most clear 
expression in the perceived rise in ‘anti-social behaviour’ (ASB). Crucial to Field’s 
analysis is the belief that the type of ASB that blights social relations is novel, 
hence, it demands new modes of response: ‘because it is new, effective means of 
dealing with it have generally still to be devised’ (ibid.: 44). For Field, the 
distinguishing mark of ASB is that each incident, by itself, does not warrant legal 
response, but it is in its regularity and repetitiveness that ASB ‘wields its destructive 
force’ (ibid.: 45). Central also to Field’s analysis is the focus on ‘public space’. 
Politics, he argues, needs to reconnect with questions about ‘the kinds of people we 
want as citizens’. He is keen to stress that intervention should not encroach on the 
private sphere. However, once private opinions and the ‘values that determine 
conduct’ operate in the public domain ‘they cease to be a private concern only, and 
become part of the stuff of politics… If the new politics can be said to be about 
anything, it is on how best to challenge the private views and values which are 
impacting so adversely on public conduct’ (ibid.: 55).  
 
Field’s analysis is pertinent for our purposes, not only because his diagnosis of 
contemporary problems of behaviour chimes with, and has informed, the resultant 
anti-social behaviour (and ‘Respect’) agenda which has been a prominent facet of 
British government policy in the last decade, but also because of the solutions that 
he proffers. He articulates the need for a politics that seeks to rebuild ‘a shared sense 
of common decencies’ through the construction of a new ‘social highway code’ 
(ibid.: 137) in which conditionality is a defining element:  
 
 ‘the best way of doing this is to begin forging a series of contracts which cover the 
behaviour of all of us as we negotiate the public realm… These contracts need to cater for 
each key stage in our life, at birth, at school, in work, in drawing welfare and at 
retirement. If the tide is to be turned and anti-social behaviour put to flight, the task is 
nothing less than the forging of a series of public contracts on behaviour… to help shape 
behaviour these contracts have to be built up, taught and enforced.’ (ibid.: 82).  
 
Ultimately, what Field is calling for is a fundamental reworking and re-writing of 
the (implicit) social contract in the shape of a multitude of formal micro-social 
contracts setting out social responsibilities, obligations, duties and commitments as 
well as rights and benefits. This is what Tony Blair’s government evocatively 
termed the ‘something for something society’ (Home Office 2003); whereby access 
to public services, resource and social insurance are conditional upon conduct and 
behaviour. Importantly, the form of the ‘contract’ (or rather quasi-legal contract) is 
identified, here, as the appropriate regulatory tool rather than the penal or criminal 
law (Crawford 2003; 2009b). Not only is the former the archetypical mode of neo-
liberal control but it also accords well within a market-based regime of choice, in 
treating its prime agents as autonomous rational choice actors.  
 
But it is in his diagnosis of the fundamental social malaise as lying in the 
degradation of local order (and insecurity) due to individual behaviour that Field’s 
analysis resonates so vibrantly with contemporary shifts in governance. Whilst what 
Field describes as the ‘politics of behaviour’ has taken different forms across 
divergent jurisdictions - from ‘zero tolerance policing’ to concerns with ‘quality of 
life’ and ‘community cohesion’ - what they all reflect is a fundamental narrowing 
and re-sighting of the preoccupations of governing to focus on public displays of 
individual behaviour as the crucible in which the fortunes of governments are 
forged. Responding to, and assuaging, public perceptions via the regulation of 
uncivil behaviour has become an increasingly prominent governmental raison 
d’être. These concerns dovetail (albeit ambiguously) with the ‘individualisation of 
risk’ thesis. Whereas Field sees private values polluting the public domain as the 
source of contemporary social ills, by contrast Beck implies that public issues are 
redefined as private matters, to be resolved internally. It is the blurring and 
transgression of the boundary between private and public - between the individual 
and the social - and the legitimate role and expectations of the citizen and the state 
which have been rendered so problematic. 
 
What both perspectives point to is the limited capacity of the state to effect change, 
in the face of uncontrollable flows of capital, goods, people and risks, and the 
renewed focus on the management of public displays of personal behaviour. The 
internal world of the individual is seen as the site where societal problems are raised 
and, consequently, where apparently they must be resolved. Hence, micro-
management is gradually replacing the tasks of macro-government. The appropriate 
role of government has shifted to that of steering, persuading, monitoring and 
correcting people’s life-style ‘choices’. In this, aside from offering institutional 
guidance, increasingly, the role of the state is reduced to one of mopping up market 
failures and market excesses – from the social consequences of the meltdown in the 
banking system, via the alcohol-fuelled excesses of the night-time economy (so 
evident across most British towns and cities), to the socially marginalised ‘flawed 
consumers’ of a market economy (Crawford and Flint 2009).  
 
The particular - and somewhat peculiar - governmental form that this has taken in 
the UK has been the ‘anti-social behaviour’ (and Respect) agenda, which has 
stimulated an unprecedented period of intensive hyper-activity and frenetic reform. 
ASB has come to comprise a distinctive, if capacious, policy field around which 
consecutive New Labour governments have introduced a plethora of hybrid tools 
that blur traditional distinctions between civil and criminal processes and challenge 
established assumptions about due process, proportionality and the threshold for 
intervention (Burney 2009). The broad definition of ASB extends to a wide range of 
activities, misdemeanours, incivilities and crimes. In legislation it is defined as 
behaviour that ‘causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress’ to others. 
This characterisation is both subjective and context-specific as it rests on public 
perceptions. Above all else, the ASB agenda is concerned with governing ‘youth’ 
and it is in response to perceptions of youthful behaviour that much government 
energy has been targeted.1 
  
 
The array of new hybrid powers includes, inter alia, acceptable behaviour contracts 
(ABCs), anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs), parenting orders, parenting 
contracts, tenancy demotion orders, anti-social behaviour housing injunctions, 
‘crack-house’ closure orders, designated public places orders, dispersal orders and 
penalty notices for disorder. Collectively and individually, many of these modes of 
control represent a shifting orientation towards forms of governance and behavioural 
regulation that focus less on knowing and accounting for past incidences than 
disrupting, reordering and steering possible futures. They seek to regulate crime and 
disorder through their consequences for, and interconnections with, wider notions of 
community well-being and public reassurance. Simultaneously, they reflect an 
individualisation of control, in which responses are tailored around personal and 
contextual characteristics. In the process, there has been a subtle shift from due 
process requirements and proportionality as defining ideals of justice to security and 
public perceptions as predominant overarching preoccupations (Crawford 2009a). 
 
The most noteworthy of the new powers is the ASBO, a civil order which results in 
criminal sanctions if breached. This has generated significant concern that civil 
proceedings are being used as a way of evading higher standards of proof and 
evidentiary burdens associated with the criminal justice process. For instance, the 
manner in which civil proceedings allow forms of hearsay evidence, not admissible 
in the criminal court, has been central to securing successful ASBO applications. 
Furthermore, the ASBO - in the name of effectiveness (Home Office 2005) - permits 
publicity which in the case of young people has eroded the traditional right to 
anonymity in civil and criminal proceedings (Cobb 2007). In common with some 
other new powers – such as dispersal (Crawford 2008) and parenting orders - 
ASBOs constitute what Simester and von Hirsch (2006) term ‘two-step 
prohibitions’, whereby the possibility of criminal sanctions arise only in respect of 
future conduct, not in relation to the conduct that gave rise to the order in the first 
place. The conditions imposed at the fist step create something tantamount to what 
the European Commissioner for Human Rights described as ‘personalised penal 
codes, where noncriminal behaviour becomes criminal for individuals who have 
incurred the wrath of the community’ (Gil-Robles 2005: 34). The conduct that 
                                                 
1
  One of the key measurements of ASB incorporated into the British Crime Survey since 1992 
has been the extent to which ‘teenagers hanging around on the streets’ are deemed to 
constitute a problem. In the decade between 1992 and 2002 the percentage of respondents who 
perceived this to be a ‘big’ problem increased by nearly two-thirds from 20% to 33%. 
 
breaches the order, under all other circumstances, may constitute legal behaviour 
and there need be no direct relationship between the ultimate punishment and the 
original behaviour. Consequently, ASBOs criminalise conduct which otherwise 
might have been lawful – such as visiting certain places (from which the person is 
excluded), meeting certain people (from whom the person has been directed not to 
associate) or wearing certain items of clothes (which have been prohibited). The 
hybrid and civil preventive model introduced by the ASBO has been subsequently 
adapted and transplanted to the regulation of risks in other realms, such as the 
alcohol-related ‘drinking banning order’ (Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006), the 
terrorism-inspired ‘control order’ (Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005) and the 
organised crime-associated ‘serious crime prevention order’ (Serious Crime Act 
2007) (see Macdonald 2007; Zedner 2007b).  
 
The wide-ranging nature of the grounds that may trigger an ASBO, ABC, parenting 
or dispersal order affronts the ‘principle of maximum certainty’ and the 
requirements of ‘predictability’ and ‘fair warning’ (Ashworth 2006: 74), as it is not 
clear that the application of the law is knowable in advance. This undoubtedly 
offends the principles and spirit of Beccaria’s ‘dream’ of an effective and legitimate 
criminal law and weakens legal constraint on the operation of the state’s ius 
puniendi. Ramsay (2009: 135-6) notes how the lack of ‘fair warning’ evident in 
much ASB legislation may mean ‘it is ultimately impossible to be sure that you have 
acted cautiously enough in the face of the uncertainties involved and that the 
problem of insecurity is therefore created by the law rather than solved by it’. 
Furthermore, in the ‘two-step’ process, principles of proportionality are decoupled 
from structuring the relationship between past acts and future constraints. This use 
of ASB powers is evidence of what Ericson refers to as ‘counter-law’ whereby: 
‘New laws are enacted and new uses of existing law are invented to erode or 
eliminate traditional principles, standards, and procedures of criminal law that get in 
the way of pre-empting imagined sources of harm’ (2007: 27). In this light, ‘the 
counter-law of security is designed to trump law that seeks to protect citizens from 
excesses of security’ (ibid.: 163).  
 
 
Regulation 
 
The innovations intrinsic to many of the new powers and technologies spawned in 
recent years, accord with the third trend, namely an apparent shift from command-
and-control style legal forms of control to hybrid modes of regulated ‘self-
regulation’. According to some commentators, we now live in an age of ‘regulatory 
capitalism’ (Braithwaite 2008). A defining feature is the expansion in novel 
mechanisms of regulatory activity that seeks to control, direct or influence 
behaviour and the flow of events. Increasingly, regulation operates through plural 
auspices straddling traditional distinctions between corporations, the state and civil 
society (Scott 2004). From this perspective, regulation not only highlights diverse 
strategies to foster compliance that lie between punishment and persuasion but also 
enlists wider actors including the subjects of regulation themselves. Consequently, 
as I have argued elsewhere (Crawford 2006), regulatory theories connect closely 
with arguments about ‘networked’ or ‘nodal governance’ (Johnston and Shearing 
2003; Burris et al. 2005). The latter notions seek to provide a conceptual map of the 
unfolding terrain of governance understood as ‘the property of networks rather than 
as the product of any single centre of action’ (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 148), in 
which the state is accorded no particular conceptual priority in order to highlight the 
range of governmental nodes that exist and the relationships between them – notably 
the actual points where knowledge and capacity are mobilized for transmission 
across networks. Regulatory theories, by contrast, provide normative accounts of 
good governance through novel forms of regulation (Black 2001). Importantly, this 
perspective challenges us to think critically about the distinctiveness or uniqueness 
of state action within contemporary governance. 
 
In contrast to traditional mechanisms that have been associated with sovereign state-
centred rule, regulation is said to become ‘responsive’ where regulators recognise 
and respond to the conduct of those they seek to regulate in ways that are sensitive 
to the conditions in which regulation occurs and the capacity of the regulated for 
self-regulation (Braithwaite 2002: 29). Such responsiveness, it is argued, is likely to 
produce more legitimate and more effective regulatory outcomes. Implicit in models 
of regulation, therefore, are diverse assumptions about the motivations and 
competencies of regulated individuals and groups, as well as different theories of 
compliance that inform these. The vexed question with which regulatory theorists 
and practitioners must grapple is which regulatory tools to deploy under specific 
conditions; when to punish and went to persuade (Braithwaite 2008: 88).  
 
In this vein, a hugely influential paper on Personal Responsibility and Behaviour 
Change written for the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit (Halpern et al. 2004) argued 
for ways in which government can act as a more effective ‘persuader’ in changing 
behaviour in a manner that enhances personal responsibility. It highlights the limits 
of top-down (command-and-control) regulatory strategies and illustrates how 
governments can ‘help people to help themselves’. Consequently, ideas of 
‘regulatory justice’ have increasingly come to inform British policy debates about 
reform of the sanctioning system and the role of criminal justice therein. As a result 
reforms have been designed to ‘modernise sanctioning toolkits across the regulatory 
system, reflecting the risk-based approach to regulation and the broader regulatory 
reform agenda’ (Macrory 2006a: 6). Importantly, the concern is with a wide-scale 
canvas of public risk in which criminal prosecution is understood as a cluster of 
‘sanctioning tools’ within a much larger framework of regulation. 
 
From a regulatory perspective, in practice however, questions of effectiveness often 
come to trump normative principles of due process and proportionality. As such, the 
vernacular of regulation has been used frequently by politicians as a conceptual stick 
with which to attack the perceived failings of established criminal procedures. In 
many senses, an abiding legacy of the ASB agenda has been to deploy the language 
of regulation – particularly in its benevolently clothed terminology of ‘better’ and 
‘responsive’ regulation – to legitimise forms of state interventionism and control 
that challenge and circumvent traditional principles and values of (criminal) justice. 
By fusing civil and criminal processes, hybrid prohibitions have fostered ‘new 
variations of liability’ designed specifically to evade established safeguards that 
themselves have been redefined as troublesome obstacles to effective regulation 
(Ashworth 2004: 265). This much was explicitly acknowledged by Tony Blair, 
whilst Prime Minister: ‘[T]he whole purpose of the antisocial behaviour legislation 
is to change the terms of trade if you like, change the rules of the game, make sure 
that when we need to act quickly, we are able to act quickly’.2 Legal principles of 
due process and proportionality were too often seen as getting in the way of ‘action’ 
through effective social regulation (Ashworth and Zedner 2008). 
 
In the ‘politics of behaviour’, the language of regulation is particularly attractive in 
that it not only provides a critique of hierarchical command-and-control style rule of 
law (and normative principles associated with it) but also because: it conforms with, 
and advances, an epochal argument that ‘new times’ demand new responses (in 
keeping with Field’s arguments); it fosters an ‘individualisation of control’ tailored 
to the demands of particular circumstances rather than in accord with universal 
principles; it permits an intensification of control through notions of ‘regulatory 
pluralism’ (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998) that advocate the deployment of a 
mixture of regulatory instruments; its preoccupation with the effectiveness tends to 
dominate over normative issues (or principles of ‘parsimony’ that commentators like 
Braithwaite emphasise); it predominantly treats the subjects of regulation as rational, 
motivated and capable subjects; and its primary focus is on ‘governing the future’ 
rather than normatively re-ordering the past (Crawford 2009a). An abiding concern 
with the appropriation of the language of regulation in the context of governing 
crime, disorder and incivility has been the latent capacity for ‘regulatory spirals’ to 
develop against a background of public anxieties about insecurity and a pervasive 
                                                 
2
  Speech at the Meridian Community Centre in Watford, 2 September 2005. See:  
 <http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8123> (last accessed 4.6.2010). 
 
risk-averse ‘culture of fear’ (Furedi 2002). The Better Regulation Commission 
astutely outlined the dangers of such an inadvertent regulatory response to perceived 
risks:  
‘The perception of a risk emerges… A public debate follows, often based around 
headlines and incomplete or biased information, resulting in a call for “something to 
be done”, which is amplified by the media. Instinctively, the public looks to the 
Government to manage the risk. Responding to this public pressure, the government 
makes ambitious claims that it can solve the problem and steps in with a regulatory 
response, rarely considering the tradeoffs involved. As a result, the role of the 
Government as risk manager is reinforced. When the regulations are implemented, 
they inevitably fail to solve all the problems and also bring with them unintended 
consequences. With good implementation, some hazards are prevented, but this does 
not make news. Other hazards are not prevented and problems persist, leading to 
calls for more government action. As a result of more regulation, people complain 
that liberties and enterprise are diminished and criticise the “nanny state”. 
Governments are blamed for interfering and acting unreasonably and, as a result, the 
national level of frustration shifts up a notch. (If we are not careful), governments 
may seek to address issues of frustration and disengagement through more 
regulation.’ (2006: 7-9) 
 
This narrative of ‘regulatory creep’ and interference with civil liberties aptly 
captures many of the key facets of the ASB agenda and the impact of regulatory 
ideas caught up in the complex ‘politics of behaviour’ over the past decade in which 
public (mis)perceptions play a vital role. Ironically, all the talk of ‘better regulation’ 
has not diminished the resort to the criminal law and criminalisation as central 
governmental tools for fostering social compliance. The last decade in Britain has 
seen the proliferation in the number and range of new criminal laws3 and has seen 
the continued expansion in the numbers of people incarcerated within the prison 
system.4 Thus, whilst the criminal legal process, one moment, is lambasted as a ‘lost 
cause’ (Ashworth 2000) for its incapacity to regulate behaviour, the next moment it 
is resurrected as a vital and expanding component of regulation. Despite assertions 
to the contrary, assumptions that ‘regulatory justice’ necessitates ‘an extended 
toolkit’ and a ‘richer range of sanctioning tools’ (Macrory 2006b: 8, 17) are likely to 
presage greater interventionism, reinforced communication of government as 
sovereign risk manager and an extend role of punishment.  
                                                 
3
  It is estimated that between 1997 and mid-2006, some 3,200 new criminal offences were 
created, over 1,000 of which were introduced by primary legislation (Morris 2006). During the 
same period, the Home Office produced some 60 crime-related bills. 
4
  Since the beginning of 1993 the prison population in England and Wales has more than 
doubled, rising from 41,600 to over 85,000 by June 2010. 
 
  
Conditions of Uncertainty and Precaution 
 
This brings us to the final theme namely the allied notions of uncertainty and 
precaution that have come to the fore in policy debate and political initiatives. The 
contemporary focus on governing future risks has raised questions about the 
robustness and fallibility of risk assessments. To prevent, pre-empt and manage 
future risks and insecurities demands ‘bringing the future into the present’. By 
necessity, it relies upon knowledge derived from the past. Risk-based (actuarial) 
thinking involves prediction based on past events and probabilities of the possible 
loss, injury or other adverse circumstances projected into the future. It treats the 
future as knowable, based on rational scientific knowledge. Whilst the science of 
‘prediction’ has significantly influenced the world of governing crime and insecurity 
in the form of ‘actuarial justice’ (Feeley and Simon 1992); profiling and targeted 
policing (Harcourt 2007) as well as risk-focused prevention (Farrington 2007), the 
scientific-base for prevention and pre-emption remains highly indecisive and 
ambiguous. In governing the future, uncertainty prevails. Determining where risks 
arise from and who presents a risk test the limits of our ability to predict the future. 
The limitations of knowledge merely magnify uncertainty. Furthermore, they 
question the extent to which the individualisation of risk is realised in practice or 
alternatively, takes the form of ‘categorisation’ whereby, individuals ‘are grasped 
not as coherent subjects, whether understood as moral, psychological or economic 
agents, but as members of particular subpopulations and the intersection of various 
categorical indicators’ (Feeley and Simon 1994: 178). My own assessment of these 
debates (as I hope to demonstrate) is that in the context of security, criminal justice 
practices that infuse the language of risk still retain notions of individual need 
(O’Malley 2004), whilst the lack of robust and un-contentious scientific knowledge 
has weakened the claims of risk prevention through actuarial justice. 
 
In the context of (internal) security threats, the attacks in the US on 11 September 
2001 poignantly highlighted the problems of foresight, raised questions about 
established methodologies for generating actionable intelligence and challenged 
certain assumptions about the appropriate threshold for intervention. As such, 9/11 
influenced much security debate regarding risk assessment, managing insecurities 
and how formal systems of control are enacted under conditions of uncertainty. In a 
European context, this was given further salience in the light of the subsequent 
bombings in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005. In a much-quoted statement, the 
former US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld speaking in early 2002, assessed 
the so-called ‘new’ terrorist threats in the light of the 9/11 attacks and the failure to 
predict or prevent them, in the following memorable turn of phrase: 
  ‘Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because as 
we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know 
there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. 
But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones we don’t know we don’t know.’5 
 
Whilst his comments were much derided at the time, Rumsfeld intimated a deeper 
set of concerns and (by implication) challenges for governments in responding to 
perceptions of crime and insecurity (notably those associated with terrorist 
violence). He drew attention to the changing shape and source of contemporary 
threats to societies, highlighting the limits of expert knowledge about risks, 
underscoring the unknowability of the future and raising questions about how to 
govern under conditions of uncertainty. By implication, it is the ‘known unknowns’ 
and the ‘unknown unknowns’ – not simply the ‘known knowns’ that should be the 
focus of our concern and hence that we should fear.6 Crucially, the challenge for 
governments is how to respond to these ‘unknowns’. What is inferred is the need for 
intervention and action before a threat or risk becomes a ‘known’. It is a clarion call 
for early intervention – for pre-emptive governance – even before risks have 
expressed themselves or become acknowledged. It proclaims the need to anticipate 
and forestall potential harms. Massumi notes,  
 
 ‘rather than acting in the present to avoid an occurrence in the future, pre-emption brings 
the future into the present. It makes present the future consequences of an eventuality that 
may or may not occur, indifferent to its actual occurrence.’ (2005: 7–8) 
 
Under conditions of uncertainty a pre-emptive and preventive logic implies a 
precautionary approach. The ‘precautionary principle’ has an established role in 
policy decisions concerning environmental protection and management. In some 
legal systems, such as in laws of the European Union, the precautionary principle is 
a general and compulsory legal principle (European Commission 2000). It imposes 
upon public bodies a duty to act to avert serious or irreversible damage (Sunstein 
2005; Wiener et al. 2010). It implies a responsibility to intervene and protect the 
public from exposure to harm where scientific investigation is insufficient, 
inconclusive or uncertain but where there are indications of possible adverse effects 
or plausible risks. Protections should be relaxed only if further evidence emerges 
                                                 
5
  US Department of Defense News Transcript, 12 February 2002: 
 <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636> 
 (last accessed 4.6.2010). 
6
  Interestingly, Rumsfeld omitted to mention a fourth category of ‘unknown knowns’; the things 
we know but do not admit to knowing! This is the ‘silent evidence’ (Taleb 2007) that 
governments ignore, discard, shade from view or lock away. This reminds us of the political 
nature of knowledge claims and the uses of knowledge. 
that supports an alternative explanation. It is applied in circumstances where there 
are reasonable grounds for concern that an activity is, or could, cause harm but 
where there is uncertainty about the probability of the risk and the degree of harm 
(Ewald 2002). 
 
In the resultant ‘war on terror’, the precautionary principle took the form of the ‘one 
per cent doctrine’. Ex-vice President Dick Cheney articulated this as follows: ‘If 
there is a one per cent chance… we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our 
response… It’s not about our analysis or finding a preponderance of evidence. It’s 
about our response’ (cited in Suskind 2006: 62). Importantly, this approach to 
precaution in the face of uncertainty saw the separation of evidence and analysis 
from action and response. The bar for intervention was to be reset at a radically 
lower level, and the basis for action was to be ‘as if’ it were a certainty. 
Interestingly, whilst the Bush administration eschewed the precautionary principle 
in relation to health and environmental regulation, it embraced it in the context of 
security.7 Whereas placing the burden of proof on demonstrating safety was seen to 
be problematic in the context of the environment and health (such as GM food for 
example, see Levidow 2001) because it might stifle innovation and produce 
damaging effects of institutionalised fear, this was not deemed relevant in relation to 
security. 
 
Table 1: The lens of ‘risk’ and of ‘uncertainty’ 
Risk  Uncertainty 
• Knowledge is reliable  • Knowledge is unreliable 
• Analysis based on evidence  • Separation of evidence/ 
• Risk assessment   analysis from action/ 
• Evidence-based policy   response 
• Actuarial techniques/tools  • ‘What if?’; Worst-case 
• ‘Science of prediction’   scenarios 
• Categorisation of  • Pre-emption, prevention 
 dangerous populations  • Early intervention 
• Profiling, targeted policing  • Suspicion – ‘actionable 
 and surveillance   intelligence’ 
   • ‘Pre-crime’ – incivilities,  anti- 
    social behavior, ‘radicalisation’ 
                                                 
7
  A White House official in charge of vetting regulations is quoted as having told the New York 
Times in 2003 that the Bush administration considered the precautionary principle ‘to be a 
mythical concept, perhaps like the unicorn’ (cited in Gardner 2008: 319). On the divergent and 
selective application of precaution to particular risks in Europe and the US see Wiener et al. 
(2010). 
Anticipating and forestalling potential crime and behaviour-related harms, in a risk-
averse ‘culture of fear’ where a ‘politics of behaviour’ prevails, will frequently 
imply erring on the side of caution. From this perspective, people are to be judged in 
terms of what they might do. Zedner notes, ‘precaution places uncertainty – not 
knowledge – centre stage’ (2009: 37). In contemporary quests for security, it is 
‘uncertainty’ that comes to constitute an increasingly dominant ‘justification for 
governmental action… It is now our not knowing, our inability to know, or 
unwillingness to prove what we think we know that provides the reason to act before 
that unknown threat makes itself known’ (ibid.: 58). What Rumsfeld is highlighting 
is a subtle shift from ‘risk’ analysis to ‘uncertainty’ as the lens through which state’s 
construct the social problems they seek to govern (see Table 1). Zedner notes: 
 
 ‘Whereas risk-thinking stimulated the development of profiling, targeted surveillance, 
categorisation of suspect populations and other actuarial techniques for managing high-
risk populations, uncertainty promotes a different set of techniques geared at requiring 
public officials to act preemptively to avert potentially grave harms using undifferentiated 
measures that target everyone.’ (2009: 45) 
 
Whilst risk assessments seek to predict the future on the basis of knowledge about 
how people performed and events unfolded in the past, the logic of security 
decisions under uncertainty focuses on the questions ‘what might be?’ or ‘what if?’ 
(Walklate and Mythen 2008). This prompts the identification of ‘worst-case 
scenarios’ and potential catastrophic consequences without a clear understanding of 
the likelihood that such outcomes will occur (Sunstein 2007). Given the emotions 
and affective sentiments that crime, disorder and threats to security generate, such 
premonitions are liable to dampen public attention to questions of probability and 
proportionality of response. In this light, uncertainty and not knowing, rather than 
being constructed as a cause for fatalistic inertia, are invested with the urgent need 
for vital and potent pre-emptive measures, as well as a radical rethinking of the 
legitimate grounds for early interventions (Dershowitz 2006). Uncertainty privileges 
security and provokes preventive action before risks express themselves (O’Malley 
2004).  
 
Governing under conditions of uncertainty has significant implications for 
traditional principles of criminal justice, notably the presumption of innocence, due 
process protections and proportionality. Mythen and Walklate note: ‘Once one 
assumes a projective ‘What if?’ position, presumption of innocence metamorphoses 
into presumption of guilt’ (2008: 234). In defending the decision to go to war with 
Iraq, Tony Blair gave an illustrative summation of the logical perils of governing by 
posing the question ‘what if?’: 
 
 ‘Here is the intelligence. Here is the advice. Do you ignore it? But, of course intelligence 
is precisely that: intelligence. It is not hard fact. It has its limitations… But in making that 
judgement, would you prefer us to act, even if it turns out to be wrong? Or not to act and 
hope it’s OK? And suppose we don’t act and the intelligence turns out to be right, how 
forgiving will people be?’8 
  
The larger the scale of the risk and the more harmful its consequences might be, the 
more indefensible inaction becomes. In such circumstances, the question ‘what if?’ 
prompts action ‘just in case’. Uncertainty, by demanding precaution, invokes action 
even in situations where it is not possible to know the precise nature or extent of the 
potential threat that is posed. This is where decision-making about security is 
facilitated, ‘not in a context of certainty, nor even of available knowledge, but of 
doubt, premonition, foreboding, mistrust, fear and anxiety’ (Ewald 2002: 294).  
 
Yet as Zedner (2009) notes, ‘uncertainty’ does not displace ‘risk’. Rather, they co-
exist at the evident boundaries of knowledge. The contemporary governance of risk 
- in contrast to the assertions of some criminologist (Feeley and Simon 1994) - is not 
dominated by the logic of actuarialism (least of all in the field of crime and 
insecurity), and contrary to Knight’s (1921) distinction, risk and uncertainty are not 
different classes of object. Risk management, Power (2007) proposes, has taken the 
form of ‘organized uncertainty’. He traces the shift from risk analysis to risk 
governance and argues that much of what today we call risk management is in fact 
‘uncertainty management’ – i.e. ‘efforts to manage “risk objects” for which 
probability and outcome data are, at a point in time, unavailable or defective’ (ibid.: 
26). Yet ‘risk’ retains an important place, for risk unlike uncertainty, always 
demands action. It implies the need to make decisions about the future and the allied 
allocation of responsibility for decisions taken. It insinuates the decidability and 
management of danger and hence raises expectations about its governance. Power 
goes on to argue: ‘Uncertainty is therefore transformed into risk when it becomes an 
object of management, regardless of the extent of information about probability’ 
(2007: 6). Rumsfeld’s ‘unknown unknowns’ and Cheney’s ‘one per cent doctrine’ 
are both attempts to ‘organise uncertainty’ as if it was manageable. In so doing, the 
management of uncertainty creates expectations and distributes responsibilities. 
Most notably, the public are drawn into this web of expectations over future 
governance, especially in relation to risks over which they have some responsibility 
and which impact most acutely on their perceptions of security and safety. In the 
politics of risk management as in the politics of policing and insecurity, public 
                                                 
8
  <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5461> 
  (last accessed 4.6.2010) 
 
perceptions matter. This enmeshing of the public in risk governance, however, 
generates its own dilemmas:  
 
 ‘Public perceptions of risk are not simply a new factor in more intelligent risk analysis, 
they are a source of risk themselves. So, the shift from risk analysis to risk governance is 
in part a strategy to govern unruly perceptions and to maintain the production of 
legitimacy in the face of these perceptions’ (Power 2007: 21) 
 
However, Wynne (1993) warns against any simplistic assumption that laypeople are 
essentially defensive, risk- and uncertainty-averse, and unreflexive whilst science, 
on the other hand, is assumed to be the epitome of reflexive self-criticism. Rather, 
he shows that laypeople display considerable reflexive negotiation of their identity 
in relationships to science and scientific institutions. Related claims in the context of 
crime and security ‘talk’ have recently been voiced by Loader and Sparks (2010). 
 
Whilst not knowing can be a powerful justification for intervention, so too, risk 
assessments allow the narrowing of risk pools such that the inconveniences of 
universal precautions can be displaced onto certain (often marginal) groups alone. 
Hence, whilst uncertainty might license ‘undifferentiated measures that target 
everyone’, as Zedner (2009: 45) argues, and the targets of surveillance are 
increasingly arbitrary, there are strong political incentives and economic imperatives 
to reduce this burden to the most ‘risky’ groups in society. The pressures to target 
resources and minimize the burdens of security to the general public are likely to 
result in the sacrifice of ‘other people’s’ freedoms to make ‘us’ (the dominant 
majority) feel more secure. In legitimising and informing the process of targeting, 
knowledge (or a least certain knowledge claims) about risk remains vital. As Ericson 
astutely notes, ‘risk assessment is rarely based on perfect knowledge, and typically 
frays into uncertainty’ (2005: 659). Whilst we all might be inconvenienced at 
airports by the routine (post-9/11) security checks, these have not displaced more 
targeted forms of screening nor the quest for ‘fast-track’ procedures for less risky 
groups – for example, on the basis that they buy into schemes that require the 
provision of personal and biometric data (such as a fingerprint and/or an iris scan).9 
Rather than sidelining knowledge, responding to conditions of uncertainty prompts 
the search for and legitimises imperfect and less robust knowledge claims. Thus, 
subjective perceptions (rather than objective risks) become more important in 
informing reassurance strategies (Crawford 2007). The quest for novel sources of 
                                                 
9
  For example, Frankfurt airport started a biometric scheme in February 2004 as part of the EU’s 
Border Check initiative and Heathrow announced the establishment of such a scheme in 
Terminal 3 in late 2006. America’s Transportation Security Administration – set up to improve 
security after 9/11 - launched its Registered Traveler Pilot Program at five airports in 2004 
(Frary 2004).  
information upon which strategies can be constructed prompts a host of precursory 
identifiers of ‘potential risk’ and categorisations of ‘suspect populations’ – or what 
Zedner (2007a) aptly terms ‘pre-crime’.10 This highlights various forms of 
behaviour or activities which come to be seen as ‘troublesome’ and hence 
‘criminalisable’ not in and of themselves (i.e. because they are directly harmful to 
others per se) but because of the way in which they are conceived - from a 
developmental and temporal perspective - as in someway precursors to criminal 
behaviour. This includes behaviour that is not-yet-criminal but which is deemed to 
be an indicator of likely or potential future criminal conduct. ‘Anti-social behaviour’ 
is an exemplary illustration of ‘pre-crime’; heralding earlier intervention. Likewise 
the contemporary focus on ‘failing’ families and ‘inadequate’ parenting in relation 
to youth crime has been justified by reference to the likely consequences of non-
intervention. To this end, in 2006 Tony Blair announced targeting families and 
screening for risk of future criminality to prevent problems developing when 
children grow older. He justified this by articulating a classic precautionary 
approach: ‘If we are not prepared to predict and intervene far more early, children 
are going to grow up in families that we know perfectly well are completely 
dysfunctional’.11 
  
In the context of terrorism, indicators of ‘radicalisation’ have become the ‘pre-
crime’ equivalent. In the process, policy preoccupations with ‘radicalisation’ 
establish a significantly lower threshold for intervention, as set out both in the UK’s 
counter-terrorism ‘Prevent’ agenda (HM Government 2009) and the analogous 
European strategy (European Union 2005). Aradau and van Munster are therefore 
correct to assert that ‘the war on terror displays an insatiable quest for knowledge: 
profiling populations, surveillance, intelligence, knowledge about catastrophe 
management, prevention, etc.’ (2007: 91). Risk here is reconceptualised as 
                                                 
10
  Pre-crime ‘shifts the temporal perspective to anticipate and forestall that which has not yet 
occurred and may never do so… The shift is not only temporal but also sectoral; spreading out 
form the State to embrace pre-emptive endeavours only remotely related to crime’ (Zedner 
2007a: 262). 
11
  Despite Blair’s apparent certainty and confidence in the predictive capacity of developmental 
criminology’s risk-focused prevention in relation to juvenile criminality, a government 
scientific report a few years earlier had arrived at a very different conclusion:  
 ‘[A]ny notion that better screening can enable policy makers to identify young children 
destined to join the 5 per cent of offenders responsible for 50-60 per cent of crime is fanciful. 
Even if there were no ethical objections to putting “potential delinquent” labels round the 
necks of young children, there would continue to be statistical barriers… [Research] shows 
substantial flows out of as well as in to the pool of children who develop chronic conduct 
problems. As such [there are] dangers of assuming that anti-social five-year olds are the 
criminals or drug abusers of tomorrow...’ (Utting 2004: 99) 
 
‘precautionary risk’, which ‘has given birth to new configurations of risk that 
require that the catastrophic prospects of the future be avoided at all costs’ (ibid.). 
Here, suspicion becomes actionable intelligence. Intelligence, after all, is simply 
information with value-added analysis (Walker 2007: 1455). It is ‘information that 
has been processed to provide foresight – a predictive capacity about how to act at 
some point in the future to achieve particular objectives given certain conditions’ 
(Innes 2006: 229). But the robustness of the predictive capacity may be weak or 
highly contingent. 
 
What is evident is the manner in which counter-terrorism responses have come to 
inform, and be informed by, developments and trends in neighbourhood policing, 
border controls and community cohesion more generally. In the process the 
precautionary principle, traditionally associated with serious, irreversible damage 
and environmental catastrophe, has leaked into the regulation of low-level social 
disorder, incivilities and disruptions to quality of life. It is increasingly argued that 
the demands of contemporary policing in the context of uncertainty necessitate the 
better integration of community intelligence through neighbourhood policing with 
counter-terrorism activities: ‘Community intelligence applied to counter-terrorism is 
precisely the type of data that might help police to circumvent the intelligence gaps 
and blind spots that seemingly inhere in their established methods’ (Innes 2006: 
230). Regardless of its merits in generating ‘actionable intelligence’, such a vision 
of policing presages both a pervasive extension of ‘the subtle indicators of 
suspicion’ (ibid.: 224) and an intertwining of ‘high’ and ‘low’ policing as well as a 
blurring of sources of insecurity and types of harm. 
 
As such, uncertainty and precaution demand the voracious collection of diverse 
sources of information, to enable analysts to ‘join up the dots’. This has prompted 
greater investment in the use of data pools, the storing of DNA records and risk 
profiling. Information and personal data collection, searching and sifting are at the 
forefront of ‘organising uncertainty’ and ‘managing risk’. Personal data drawn from 
official and public records and from consumer activities are increasingly used by 
commercial interests and governments to differentiate and classify customers, 
citizens and aliens alike through algorithmic profiles. On the one hand, ‘categorical 
seduction’ informs the corporate wooing of prized consumers. On the other hand, 
‘categorical suspicion’ attends to certain groups of potential offenders and 
‘dangerous types’ (Lyon 2007: 103). Here, information provides the basis for social 
sorting. However partial the profiles generated, their capacity to respond to the 
demands for organising uncertainty, stimulate quests for additional sources of 
information upon which categories of suspicion might be constructed, despite the 
vast quantities of ‘false positives’ that such data trawling, by necessity, generates. 
Collectively, the increasing combination of disparate data pools allows for the 
construction of a ‘surveillance assemblage’ (Haggerty and Ericson 2000) with added 
dimensions of social sorting potential, but also considerable scope for friction, 
failure and information overload.  
 
 
Contested Expertise and Evidence 
 
The pathology of insecurity lies not only in the limitations of knowledge on which 
to construct predictive interventions but also in the manner in which knowledge and 
expertise are contested. Knowledge, as Ericson notes is both an ‘object and 
instrument of suspicion’ (2007: 204). Not only may there be deeply held distrust on 
the part of the public of expert judgements of risk but so too for politicians the 
language of risk may not sit well with requirement for action. This is particularly 
evident in relation to the sensitivities of crime and victimisation where demands for 
certainty abound. As Ewald notes, ‘this does not mean that scientific expertise is 
useless, but that it will not release the politician from the sovereignty of his or her 
decision’ (2000: 77). Managing uncertainty means that politicians are selective in 
their tolerance of potentially harmful activities.  
 
Witness, for example, the furore in Britain in early 2009 when Professor David Nutt, 
the Chair of the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD), in an editorial 
in the Journal of Psychopharmacology suggested that the risk of death from the drug 
Ecstasy is lower than the risk of death from horse-riding - an addiction he tongue-in-
cheek termed ‘Equasy’ (Nutt 2009a). He used the comparisons of risks to highlight 
the need for a ‘more relevant harm assessment process’ and concluded: ‘The use of 
rational evidence for the assessment of the harms of drugs will be one step forward 
to the development of a credible drugs strategy’ (ibid.: 5). In an enlightening 
response to such a ‘scientific claim’, the British Home Secretary at the time, Jacqui 
Smith, demanded that he apologise and told MPs: ‘I felt his comments went beyond 
the scientific advice that I expect from him as chair of the ACMD… He apologised 
to me for his comments, and I have asked him to apologise to the families of the 
victims of ecstasy, too’.12 This highlights the political and cultural salience of 
certain risks and harms as against others, as well as the manner in which public 
perceptions once enmeshed in risk governance generate their own dilemmas that can 
serve to undermine a rational harm assessment debate.  
 
However, the matter did not rest there. In October 2009 Professor Nutt was sacked 
from his government advisory post by the subsequent Home Secretary, Alan 
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  Hansard, House of Commons 9 Feb 2009: Column 1093. 
 
Johnson. Professor Nutt’s subsequent crime was to give a lecture (which was later 
published) on the relative risks of various drugs in which he argued that Jacqui 
Smith’s use of the ‘precautionary principle’ in reversing a decision to downgrade the 
classification of cannabis, could do more harm than good. An extract that 
particularly wrangled with the government is worth quoting at length:  
 
 ‘To repeat what the former Home Secretary said, “We must err on the side of caution and 
protect the public.” As this is protection from the known unknowns, at first sight it might 
seem the obvious decision – why wouldn’t you take the precautionary principle? We 
know that drugs are harmful and that you can never evaluate a drug over the lifetime of a 
whole population, so we can never know whether, at some point in the future, a drug 
might lead to or cause more harm than it did early in its use. The precautionary 
principle… may end up doing more harm than one might assume… More important, I 
think, the precautionary principle misleads. It starts to distort the value of evidence and 
therefore I think it could, and probably does, devalue evidence. This leads us to a position 
where people really don’t know what the evidence is. They see the classification, they 
hear about evidence and they get mixed messages. There’s quite a lot of anecdotal 
evidence that public confidence in the scientific probity of government has been 
undermined in this kind of way… Making all drugs class A would be a logical conclusion 
of the precautionary principle, but would be a supreme mistake.’ (Nutt 2009b: 8, 
emphasis in original). 
 
This incident highlighted not only the manner in which - under conditions of 
uncertainty - expert advice becomes contested, but also the way in which a 
precautionary logic diminishes the value of evidence and decouples it from directly 
conditioning the nature of the response. In its place, worst-case scenarios, ‘what if?’ 
questions and suspicion fill the void. Managing risk perceptions squeezes out and 
supplants rational risk analysis.  
 
 
Concluding thoughts 
 
Contemporary security threats from terrorist violence, through ‘ordinary’ crime to 
acts of disorder and anti-social behaviour, undoubtedly present real and pressing 
challenges for governments, businesses and citizens alike. But there are evident 
dangers that in the way in which we both interpret risk and ‘unknown dangers’ and 
respond to them, we may be undermining some of the core values and principles of 
democratic societies, whilst eroding relations of social trust and mutual toleration. 
As a consequence, the balance between security and freedom has become possibly 
the most prominent contemporary challenge for European polities. The demand for 
security in societies where individuals have come to experience ever greater 
‘freedom’ is a vexed one. The concern is that it frequently means sacrificing ‘other 
people’s’ freedoms to make ‘us’ feel more secure. This has adverse implications for 
marginal and marginalised groups within societies, those upon whom dominant 
groups project their fears and anxieties. Hence, the questions ‘whose fears?’, ‘whose 
security?’ and ‘whose freedoms?’ are particularly salient albeit often less evident in 
debates about threats of terrorism and political violence as well as other 
contemporary fears and responses to them. In the political confrontation between 
fear and liberty, where necessary, actions that infringe liberties are more evidently 
justifiable if those who support the actions are burdened by them and their impacts 
are not restricted to members of identifiable minority groups - whether implicitly or 
through differential implementation.  
 
In governmental responses to perceptions of crime and insecurity, notably terrorism, 
precaution is becoming a key driver, in a way that licenses early interventions before 
our ‘unknown unknowns’ express themselves. In a context of uncertainty and in the 
search for (an unattainable absolute) security, mere suspicion, the perceptions of 
others, the appearance of potentially risky behaviour and worst-case scenarios may 
be sufficient grounds for pre-emptive action. There is a need to consider and 
challenge the evidence and assess the different courses of action available. As 
Sunstein asserts: ‘Democratic governments care about facts as well as fears… they 
take careful steps to ensure that laws and policies reduce, and do not replicate, the 
errors to which fearful people are prone’ (2005: 226). In ‘governance through 
precaution’, we may be in the process of discarding cherished civil liberties and 
legal principles in order to intervene at the earliest possible stage to stop our 
unknown demons surfacing. In so doing, we are in the process of widening our 
apparatuses of control and overloading these with information from diverse data-
banks, in the hope that this will allow us to ‘join up the dots’ to identify potential 
risks and pre-empt the future. Whilst deliberate inaction in the face of evidence of 
possible serious and irreversible harm is understandably hazardous, so too over-
reaction can at times present greater dangers, particularly where this generates 
unintended consequences and results in the consumption of resources that might 
have been deployed in more beneficial endeavours. 
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